In the aftermath of the recent 12-day war involving Israel and Iran, the Iranian regime has intensified its internal repression, resembling the authoritarianism seen in North Korea. Kasra Aarabi, director of research on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) at United Against Nuclear Iran, characterizes this shift as a movement toward an isolated control model. Aarabi highlights that while the Iranian regime has always maintained a totalitarian grip on power, the current level of repression is unprecedented. Reports from within Iran indicate that citizens are vulnerable to random searches and confiscations of their phones, with severe consequences for any content that is deemed critical of the regime or supportive of Israel.
During the conflict, the Iranian leadership imposed a total internet blackout to suppress communication, which included blocking alerts regarding Israeli actions. This blackout not only isolated the Iranian population from critical information but also served to manipulate public perception, casting Israel in a negative light. Aarabi notes that this stifling of communication aimed at creating fear among the populace and eroding the unexpected sympathy some Iranians had developed for Israel, especially because many viewed Israeli strikes as targeting the IRGC—the forces responsible for their oppression.
Prominent scholars like Dr. Afshon Ostovar emphasize that domestic repression has been a reliable strategy for the regime’s survival. As the IRGC tightens its grip and becomes more insular, it risks adopting even more repressive measures, drawing parallels to North Korea’s political culture. Ostovar asserts that this approach to maintaining control could lead to an escalation in autocracy and further isolation from external influences, as the regime increasingly fears that the population may rise against it.
Internally, the IRGC faces its own turmoil, marked by a crisis of trust and potential purges within its ranks. Aarabi suggests that the military operations during the recent conflict indicate a significant infiltration at high levels, leading to an immense push for accountability within the IRGC’s hierarchy. The younger generation of commanders, indoctrinated since 2000, is becoming more radical and has begun to challenge senior leadership, accusing them of being too lenient toward Israel, which may set the stage for a violent internal shift as the IRGC grapples with trust issues.
The current instability in Iran’s military doctrine, particularly with traditional strategies being undermined, could lead the regime to rely more heavily on terrorist tactics, particularly asymmetric warfare. Aarabi notes that with the degradation of the regime’s three fundamental pillars—its militias, ballistic missile capabilities, and nuclear ambitions—Iran may increasingly turn to soft-target terrorism as a primary means of influence, emphasizing plausible deniability to navigate both domestic and international challenges.
Overall, while the Iranian regime’s oppressive actions reflect a desperate attempt to maintain control, they also signal profound insecurity within its ranks. Aarabi argues that genuine strength would not necessitate such brutal suppression of the populace. Until the regime’s repressive apparatus is effectively dismantled, the potential for upheaval remains suppressed, indicating that significant regime change is unlikely in the immediate future.
