As the Iranian regime faces the consequences of sustained Israeli military strikes on its military and nuclear infrastructure, the conversation around its potential downfall intensifies. Experts now consider the collapse of the Islamic Republic a possibility, though they emphasize that the aftermath could lead to either a more democratic Iran or increased instability. Reza Pahlavi, the exiled crown prince and a key figure in the opposition, points to internal reports suggesting that the regime’s command structures are deteriorating rapidly. He asserts that discussions regarding a post-Islamic Republic era are underway, signaling a shift in the international community’s understanding that the Islamic Republic may not have a viable future.
Diverse opinions exist regarding the potential paths forward. Behnam Taleblu from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies suggests that the terms “evolution” and “devolution” are more apt than “revolution,” as the outcomes could either improve or worsen the situation. He raises concerns that both the opposition forces within Iran and Western governments have not adequately considered the prospects of regime change, leaving them unprepared for both political transitions and the upheaval that may ensue.
Iran expert Beni Sabti identifies four potential scenarios that could unfold in light of recent events. Firstly, a collapse from within, similar to the Soviet Union’s downfall, could be precipitated by leaders within the Revolutionary Guards rebelling against the regime. He points out that after Israel’s elimination of several Iranian generals, the regular army might be better positioned to take control. However, Taleblu notes that Iran has historically fortified its military against coups through strategic placement and loyalty, making a classic coup less likely, though not entirely impossible.
Another possible scenario includes the potential for a popular uprising, particularly if political prisoners are released, as many prominent figures remain imprisoned. These individuals could unite the public, rekindling animosity towards the regime that has been lingering since the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests catalyzed by socio-economic issues. A significant portion of the populace is disillusioned, leading Taleblu to state that roughly 80% of Iranians harbor disdain for the current regime, which is crucial for understanding the dynamics of any potential uprising.
The return of exiled Iranian leaders presents a third possibility, as some segments of the population express nostalgia for the monarchy. Sabti suggests that if political infighting escalates among current leaders, former leaders like Pahlavi may be seen as uniting symbols rather than effective rulers. Although Taleblu acknowledges the diaspora’s potential, he insists that the future of Iran should be determined by those within the country, emphasizing that they should lead any change.
Sabti’s worst-case scenario involves the regime’s survival, which Taleblu warns could result in an even more repressive governing structure. If the Islamic Republic persists, it may shift toward a more militarized rule, driven by a younger generation of Islamic Revolutionary Guards who might foster a more radical approach. The roles of Iran’s non-Persian communities, including the Ahwazi, Baloch, Azeris, and Kurds, also pose a significant question for the future of the nation. Aref Al-Kaabi from the State of Ahwaz argues that without support and trust between these communities and Persian opposition forces, meaningful change will remain out of reach. He insists that cooperation and support from the international community are vital for facilitating any substantial political transformation in Iran.
