The upcoming meeting of the 27 foreign affairs ministers of the European Union in Copenhagen is poised to confront a critical question: what new sanctions will be imposed on Russia in response to its ongoing aggression against Ukraine? The recent destruction of the EU’s delegation in Kyiv has further galvanized the EU’s resolve to tighten economic penalties on Russia and press for negotiations with President Vladimir Putin. High Representative Kaja Kallas emphasized, “Considering how Putin is mocking the peace efforts, the only thing that works is pressure,” indicating the urgent need for escalated measures as discussions unfold.
As the EU prepares for its 19th sanctions package, the specifics of what will be included are still unclear, raising discussions on the future direction of their sanctions strategy. A four-page document prepared by the Danish presidency outlines potential sanctions targeting crucial sectors such as oil, gas, finance, and cryptocurrencies, alongside innovative measures like the “Anti-Circumvention Tool.” This tool is aimed at punishing nations that assist Russia in acquiring banned goods, marking a shift toward a more proactive approach in tackling the circumvention of existing sanctions—a concern that has been likened to a game of whack-a-mole.
The challenge of sanction circumvention has prompted the EU to consider stronger measures, as the initial reluctance to target external companies has evolved due to increasing evidence of violations. The instrument, which was introduced in 2023, permits the European Commission to impose secondary sanctions on countries aiding Russian evasion. This not only targets individual companies but can have a sweeping impact on entire economies, thereby intensifying pressure on those nations involved in aiding Russia’s military capabilities. However, the activation of this tool demands extensive analysis and, more importantly, unanimous approval from EU member states, which could prove to be a significant hurdle.
Several factors contribute to the inertia surrounding the “Anti-Circumvention Tool.” Its status as a “last resort” measure inherently raises the bar for activation, and the necessity for unanimous agreement among all member states complicates matters further. Countries like Hungary and Slovakia have previously created obstacles in sanction discussions, which suggests that reaching consensus on secondary sanctions may be even more challenging. The geopolitical dimension is intensified by the involvement of China—whose economic interests and status as a major supplier for Russia inject additional complexity into any potential EU sanctions package.
Despite robust evidence tracing the supply of critical components for Russian weaponry back to China, EU officials face significant diplomatic challenges in pursuing action. China has vocally opposed unilateral sanctions, which complicates the EU’s strategy and poses the risk of creating economic repercussions for itself. Recent tit-for-tat sanctions between Beijing and the EU highlight the fragile relational dynamics at play. With the landscape marked by economic stagnation and rising geopolitical tensions, the likelihood of member states uniting against China through secondary sanctions diminishes considerably.
As the EU approaches the critical 19th sanctions package, the emphasis will be on whether it can effectively translate its intentions into meaningful actions that impose real pressure on Russia and its enablers. The outcome may hinge not only on intra-EU dynamics but also on external actors, such as the stance of the U.S. on sanctions pressure against Russia. Some analysts suggest that if the U.S. signals support for robust measures, this could galvanize EU decision-making and encourage bolder sanctions that might alter global dynamics related to sanctions enforcement and international aid to Russia. Therefore, how the EU navigates these complex issues in its upcoming meeting could have far-reaching implications for its collective foreign policy and the broader geopolitical landscape.
